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Legal Maxim

6 Record(s) | Page [1 of 1]
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  • generale tantum valet in generalibus, quantum singulare in singulis : When words are general, they are to be taken in a general sense, just as words relating to a particular thing are to be taken as referring only to that thing
  • generalia specialibus non derogant : Generalia specialibus non derogant, or, in other words “where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without extending to subjects specially dealt with by the earlier legislation, you are not to hold that earlier or special legislation indirectly repealed, altered or derogated from merely by force of such general words, without any indication of particular intention to do so” (see Maharaja Pratap Singh Bahadur v. Man Mohan Dev AIR 1966 SC 1931). The literal meaning of this expression is that general words or things do not derogate from special. This expression was explained to mean that when there is conflict between a general and special provision, the latter shall prevail (CIT v. Shahzada Nand & Sons[1966] 60 ITR 392 (SC) and Union of India v. India Fisheries (P.) Ltd. AIR 1966 SC 35.), or the general provisions must yield to the special provisions. (State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098.) The maxim is regarded as a ‘cardinal principle of interpretation’ (State of Gujarat v. Patel Ramjibhai AIR 1979 SC 1098.), and is characterised as a well recognised principle. (See Secy. of State v. Hindustan Co-operative Society AIR 1931 PC 149 and Patna Improvement Trust v. Shrimati Lakshmi Devi AIR 1963 SC 1077.) The general provision, however, controls cases where the special provision does not apply as the special provision is given effect to the extent of its scope. (South India Corpn. (P.) Ltd. v. Secretary Board of Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207.) Thus a particular or a special provision controls or cuts down the general rule. (Bengal Immunity Co. v. State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661.) In Paradip Port Trust v. Their Workmen (AIR 1977 SC 36.), the Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether representation by a legal practitioner was permissible in an industrial dispute before adjudicatory authorities contemplated by the Industrial Disputes Act. By applying this maxim, the Supreme Court held that the special provision in the Industrial Disputes Act would prevail in that regard over the Advocates Act which was held to be a general piece of legislation relating to subject-matter of appearance of lawyers before all courts, tribunals and other authorities, whereas Industrial Disputes Act was concerned with the representation by legal practitioners. This maxim was applied when the questions relating to assessments of a firm and its partners arose under the Income-tax Act, 1961 where the dissolution of the firm and its succession are held to be governed by the Special Act viz., the Income-tax Act and not the Partnership Act. The technical view of the nature of a partnership cannot be taken in applying the law of income-tax. Where a special provision is made in derogation of the provisions of the Indian Partnership Act, the effect is given to it. Where the provisions of the Indian Income-tax Act are clear, resort cannot be had to the provisions of another statute. (Dharam Pal Sat Dev v. CIT [1974] 97 ITR 302 (P&H) and Nandlal Sohanlal v. CIT [1977] 110 ITR 170 (P&H) (FB).) When the Legislature has deliberately made a specific provision to cover a particular situation, for the purpose of making an assessment of a firm under the Income-tax Act, there is no scope for importing the concept and the provisions of the Partnership Act. (See CIT v. Shambulal Nathalal & Co.[1984] 145 ITR 329 (Kar.).) The legal position of a firm under the income-tax law is different from that under the general law of partnership in several respects : “In case of conflict between the two statutes, the general rule to be followed is that the later abrogates the earlier one. In other words, a prior special law would yield to a later general law, if either of the two following conditions is satisfied: (i) The two are inconsistent with each other; (ii) There is some express reference in the later to the earlier enactment” (Ajay Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 1130) In determining whether a statute is special or a general one, the focus must be on the principal subject-matter plus the particular perspective. For certain purposes, an Act may be general and for certain other purposes it may be special and distinction cannot be blurred when finer points of law are dealt with. The Supreme Court in D.J. Bahadur’s (See LIC of India v. D.J. Bahadur AIR 1980 SC 2181.) case held that “...vis-á-vis ‘industrial disputes’ at the termination of the settlement as between the workmen and the Corporation, the Industrial Disputes Act is a special legislation and the LIC Act is a general legislation. Likewise, when compensation on nationalisation is the question, the LIC Act is the special statute. An application of the generalis maxim as expounded by English textbooks and decisions leaves us in no doubt that the I.D. Act being special law prevails over the LIC Act which is but general law.”
  • generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda : General words are to be understood in a general way
  • generalibus specialia derogant : Special things derogate from general things. If a special provision is made on a certain matter, the matter is excluded from the general provisions. Applying this rule, the Supreme Court held in its judgment in South India Corpn. (P.) Ltd. v. Secretary, Board of Revenue AIR 1964 SC 207 that the general provision under Article 372 of the Constitution regarding continuance of existing laws is subject to article 277 of the Constitution which is a special provision relating to taxes, duties, cesses, or fees lawfully levied at the commencement of the Constitution. In Vinay Kumar Singh v. Bihar State Electricity Board [2003] 8 ILD 318, the Patna High Court observed that article 351 of the Constitution of India is a general provision regarding development of Hindi all over India, whereas article 348 is a specific provision with regard to the language to be used in the Supreme Court and the High Courts and that, therefore, the applicability of article 351 of the Constitution is entirely obviated.
  • grammatica falsa non vitiat chartum : False grammar does not vitiate a deed
  • gratis dictum : A mere assertion unsupported by evidence

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